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ABSTRACT

This investigation proposes a simplified concept for the rapid field design
of protective structures, subject to attack by conventional artillery rounds,
mortar rounds and small rockets.

Parameters which should be considered during a rigorous design process
are discussed.

The number and complexity of these parameters make the rigor-

ous design procedure too unwieldy to be efficiently used, in a limited time period,
when materials are not available to comply with Standard Designs.

Since the duration of an explosion pulse is very short and uncompacted soil
is capable of absorbing explosive energy, this study investigates the theory that
adequate protection can be provided by structures designed by considering only
four easily understood and readily determined parameters.

These include the

radius of destruction of the explosive projectile; the unit weight of the soil to be
used in overhead cover; the size of the structure; and the spacing of structural
members commensurate with the grade, species and dimensions of available
timber.

Tests were conducted using both small-scale and full-scale structures.

In

each case, the radius of destruction of the explosive charge was measured in the
soil used for overhead cover and determined analytically using empirical relationships.

The structures were designed to support a depth of earth cover
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slightly exceeding the larger radius of destruction.

Size and spacing of the

structural members were determined by considering the grade and species of
lumber used for construction, the unsupported span of the structural member,
dimensions and section properties of the timber, and the uniformly distributed
load applied to the structure by the soil cover.

The results generally support

the design concept and warrant further study under actual firing conditions.
Conclusions include the following:

L

Consideration of the rigorous parameters involved in dynamic load

determination may be replaced by relatively simple field observations and design aids.

2.

Because of the nature of the load pulse, for projectiles assumed in this

study, the simple and easily understood parameters of required soil cover, the
dead load caused by this cover, and the physical and mechanical properties of
construction materials are sufficient for the design of protective structures
subject to attack by these projectiles.
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PREFACE

The general idea for this investigation was conceived during this writer's
military service with the U.S. Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Republic
of Vietnam, first as Commanding Officer of Company A, 8th Engineer Battalion,
and later as the Assistant Operations Officer of that battalion.

Each U.S. Army Division has an organic Engineer Battalion.

These mili-

tary engineers perform a wide variety of tasks in support of military operations.
One of these tasks is assisting elements of a division in the construction of protective structures.

The Engineer Battalion's organization provides for subor-

dinate elements to actually perform, or at least supervise, construction tasks
while planning is done by members of the battalion staff.

The design of pro-

tective structures and required bills of materials are usually prepared by the
Assistant Operations Officer of the battalion.

Each Infantry Brigade, within a division, is normally supported by one
Combat Engineer Company from the Engineer B8ttalion.

The mission of the

Engineer Company is similar to that of the Engineer B::1tta1ion, except on a
smaller scale. With regard to construction tasks, the relationship between the
battalion and the company might be compared to that of the Architect or Design
Engineer to the General Contractor.

The Engineer Company actually performs

or supervises construction, using plans and specifications prepared at the battalion leve 1.
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In an extremely fluid situation, involving redep1oynwnt, the Engineer Company, moving with its supported brigade, may be separated from the Engineer
Battalion Headquarters by such considerable distances that even radio communications

~~

re not possible.

In this case field changes in protective structure de-

signs must be made by the engineer officer responsible for construction, based
on his experience and engineering judgement.

Standard Designs prove to be little more than a guide unless all of the n1aterials
specified by the bill of materials 3 re on hand.

Receipt of so many board feet of

lumber may not mean receipt of the various sizes of timbers required for the
posts or stringers of the protective structure.

When this happens, design changes,

or a complete redesign, must be made based on materials available.
changes, or

These

redesign, must be accomplished quickly by the officer responsible

for the construction or by someone more familiar with the design of protective
structures.

Time is a factor which must be considered in this situation, 3S

Tactical Commanders usually desire that their Operations Centers, First Aid
Stations, etc., be constructed and placed in operation as soon as possible after
oCC\lpying a new area.

Even if the distance to the Battalion Headquarters is

relatively short, the Engineer Company Commander may not h3ve time to send
back for design changes or a new design, which will utili?:e his inventory of
available construction materials.

The comments of the preceding paragraphs and those contained in the remainder of this thesis are not intended as criticisms of the U.S. Armed Forces

VJ

logistics system, nor do they imply
Corps of Engineers.

:J

shortage of

cap~1ble

personnel within the

They are based upon the experiences of one individual

during a one year period.

Their only intent is to reflect problems and pressures,

which may be encountered by personnel during field construction under adverse
conditions.

As a result of these experiences, it is believed that a simple and

rational method of rapid field design, or revision, to provide desired protection
with field available materials would be of value to other military engineers faced
with similar problems.

This is the basis upon which this investigation was

initiated.

The writer wishes to express his appreciation for the financial assistance
rendered by the University of Missouri - Rolla during the course of this investigation and to numerous faculty members who have given freely of their time
and resources to answer questions or make available reference books and/ or
necessary equipment during the pursuance of this research.

The writer is extremely grateful for assistance provided by Mr. ,J. T. Ballard
and other personnel at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterways Experiment
Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi; and by Major Ronald K. \Vhitlock and other n em1

bers of the First Advanced Individual Training Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri.

The writer would like to express his particular appreciation for the assistance
and guidance of his advisor, Dr. Jack H. Emanuel, during the course of this
investigation and the preparation of this manuscript.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Having faced the problems of protective structure design and construction
as the engineer officer responsible for construction and later as the officer
responsible for design, the writer feels that a simplified concept for the rapid
field design of protective structures would be extremely useful.

The procedure

should be sufficiently simple to allow complete understanding by personnel not
specifically trained in engineering; it should minimize the variables involved
in design; and it should provide for field changes without altering the desired
degree of protection.

Standard Designs will continue to be useful as a basis

for requisitioning construction materials and if the complete list is received,
the structure may be built without changes.

Among the parameters to be considered in the rigorous design of protective
structures are the size of the enemy projectile which might strike the structure,
the type of overhead cover to be used, the desired size of the protective structure,
the reaction of its members to dynamic loads, and, of course, available materials.

The size and type of the onticipated enemy projectile introduces the greatest degree of uncertainty in a design of this sort.

Projectiles which detonate

upon impact cause a particular loading on the structure; those which have delfly
fusing cause a different type loading, lasting for a longer period of time; and
those few that do not detonate, the "duds," cause still another loading condition.
The loading caused by exploding projectiles is primarily a function of the pro-

perties of the particular explosive contained in the projectile.

These pro-

perties may or may not be available through intelligence channels.

Even if

the explosive's properties are known, there are rel3tively few :Jvailable
people who have the ability to use them in the determination of a design loading for the protective structure.

The type of overhead cover will require additional considerations.

The

unit weight of the soil used for the cover will contribute significantly to the
de:Jd load applied to the structure.

The dry unit weight or the saturated unit

weight of most soils is not difficult to determine.

Depending on whether or not

materials are available to keep the soil dry, a reasonably accurate determination of the dead load due to soil cover c;Jn be made.

The use of coarse rocks,

logs, or steel matting to c:Juse detonation at or very ne:Jr the top surface of
the final structure will also contribute to the dead load on the structure, but
this contribution is usually very easily determined.
absorbing characteristics of these materials
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However, the energy

nd the particular soil, in either

a dry or a wet condition, are not generally known except, possibly, by those
persons whose particular are;J of interest is in Soil Mechanics or Soil Dynamics.

The size of the structure depends upon its type, the intended use,
perhaps most important, the materials available for construction.

D nd,

A statica 11~,

indeterminate structure is usually more economical from the standpoint of
materials, but experience and training of the persons responsible for design
or construction may lead to the use of a more easily analyzed statically deter-
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minate structure.

Also, rigorous consideration of dynamic loads on the

structure may be beyond the expertise of the designer.

Protection against aerial bombs, which may contain from one hundred
to more than two thousand pounds of high explosives, requires the construction
of extremely hardened protective structures.

Often constructed of thick, re-

inforced concrete, even these structures are deeply buried to afford an acceptable degree of protection.

In a situation where the friendly forces enjoy

air superiority, or the enemy's Cflpabilities are limited to mortars, conventional artillery and relatively small rockets, the requirement for such hardened and deeply buried structures may be reduced.

It is extremely difficult to make general statements which will apply to
every situation in which the military engineer may find himself.

For the

purpose of this investigation, the following basic assumptions are made:

1.

Enemy projectiles are limited to conventional artillery rounds, m or-

tar rounds and small rockets, which contain on the order of fifty pounds, or
less, of high explosives.

2.

The enemy projectiles used are all fused to detonate upon impact, or

the percentage of those with delay fusing is sufficiently small so that the assumption of impact detonation is within the limits of acceptable risk.
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3.

Construction priorities and availability of materials preclude the

use of reinforced concrete and structural steel in the construction of protective structures.

Timber will be used as the primary structural members.

The enemy projectile, or design round, against which protection is desired may be specified by the local Tactical Commander, or the size may be
determined based on recent enemy activity or intelligence reports as to enemy
capabilities within the Area of Operations.

Once the design round has been

determined, an analysis of craters which this round causes in the local soil,
when it impacts and detonates, should be made. If there are no available
craters which have been caused by enemy rounds, analysis of craters caused
by similar friendly rounds should provide sufficiently accurate information as
to the effects of the design round.

For example, the effects of a U.S. Slmm

mortar round should compare favorably to those of an enemy 82mm mortar round,
as should the effects of a U.S. 155mm artillery round compare to those of an
enemy 152mm artillery round.

The crater analysis will provide the designer

with information regarding the effects of the design round on the particular
soil he intends to use as cover for the protective structure.

The specific items

of interest, when making the crater analysis, are the determination of the
crater depth and radius.

It must be emphasized that it is the true crater depth

and radius that should be measured (Fig. 1).
an apparent depth and radius.

The observed crater will have

However, the true depth and radius should be

determined by gently excavating the loose soil from the crater.

The measured

true crater depth and radius gives the designer an idea as to the minimum depth
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Figure 1. Typical Crater, Showing Apparent and True Dimensions.
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of soil cover which must be used.

The intent of this investigation is to determine the feasibility of limiting
the variables involved in protective structure design to the required depth of
overhead cover and the selection and spacing of structural members.

By

analyzing the true crater caused by the design round, the effects of the exploding projectile and the energy absorbing characteristics of the soil are
measured relatively, and the designer need not have specific training in soil
mechanics or a complete knowledge of the effects of high explosives.

The true crater depth or radius, whichever is greater, gives an indication
of the minimum depth of overhead cover required on the structure.

The

theoretical radius of destruction, as determined from empirical relationships,
and the measured depth or radius of the actual true crater should be compared
and the larger value selected.

The selected radius of destruction and applied

factors of safety will enable the designer to determine the required depth of
overhead cover.

This depth and the unit weight of the soil, in either a dry or

a. saturated state, are used to compute the uniformly distributed dead load

which will be applied to the structure.

Determination of the required size

and spacing of structural members may then be done in the usual manner based
on available materials and the designer's ability to analyze either statically
indeterminate or determinate structures.

Standard Designs should be used for the construction of protective structures

7

whenever the required materials are available, as they provide maximum
protection for personnel and the most efficient use of materials.

This inves-

tigation is intended only to supplement these designs by providing an easily
understood procedure which may be rapidly applied, if materials are not
available to comply strictly with the Standard Design.
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II.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Although it is highly unlikely that this investigation can be considered nnew
work, n available information, dealing specifically with protection against
conventional artillery rounds or relatively small explosive projectiles, was
found to be limited.

Information sources range from texts dealing with specific

topics related to the investigation, to Field Manuals and Technical Reports
published by the Department of the Army, to communications with the writer's
military associates, and, finally, the writer's personal experiences and
observations.

A. Standard Designs

The U. S. Army's Field Manuals on Field Fortifications (1) and Engineer
Field Data (2) contain information and bill of materials for the construction of
protective structures.

The structures shown, however, are generally too small

for use as First Aid Stations or Operations Centers, and anticipate the extremely
severe loading of a direct hit of a 155mm, fuse-delay projectile. Both
references discuss the use of a cushion -layer, n •.. of dry untamped earth ... to
absorb the shock of detonation ... , " and the use of a burster layer, n ... of 15
to 20cm rocks or 20cm logs, wired tightly together, in two layers ... to cause
detonation of the projectile before it can penetrate to the lower ... layers. n

9

B. Parameters for Rigorous Design

As stated previously, to even attempt a rigorous protective structure
design would require knowledge of the properties of the explosive charge
contained in the design round, knowledge of the particular characteristics of the
soil to be used as overhead cover, and some degree of proficiency in the analysis
and design of structures subject to dynamic loading.

The writings of Baum (3 ), which include references to many other worldwide authors, most notably those of Zeldovich and Kompaneyets (4), show that
explosion pressures are directly proportional to the density of the explosive
and the square of the detonating velocity.

The explosion impulse is directly

proportional to the cross-sectional area and length of the explosive charge and
the density and detonating velocity of the explosive.

The time of the pulse is

related to the length of explosive charge and detonating velocity, and is given by
the following expression (3, p. 503 ):

t=~
D

(1)

where
t

= The duration of the pulse, in seconds.

,t =The length of the explosive charge, in feet.
D= The detonating velocity of the explosive, in feet per second.
Once the explosion pulse, based on pressure and area of influence, and time of
the pulse are determined, analysis of the effects on the soil cover and the actual
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structure may be made.

The pressure at some depth below the soil surface may be determined
analytically, using the Boussinesq Method for evaluating soil pressure.

A

discussion of this and other methods is available in almost any text on Soil
Mechanics or Foundation Analysis, such as those by Sowers (5) and Bowles (6).
It must be noted that these texts are concerned with Soil Mechanics and Founda-

tion Analysis and Design and deal with static loads applied to the soil by foundations, rather than dynamic loads of explosions.

In addition, the Boussinesq

Theory contains several simplifying assumptions, such as weightless soil--which
is elastic, homogeneous, semi-infinite, and isotropic and obeys Hooke's Law-and that stress distribution is symmetrical with respect to the vertical axis.
These assumptions greatly simplify the mathematical relationships used in the
Boussinesq Theory, but may give inaccurate values in the case of dynamic loads.
The pressure at some depth, as determined in this manner could, at most, be
used only as a guide.

In this case the designer is dealing with a dynamic rather

than a static load and this load is rarely applied in a vertical direction, due to
the trajectory of the incoming round.

In order to select structural members, the designer needs to know maximum

loads and/or deflections to which the members may be subjected.

A theoretical

determination of the deflection of a structural member caused by an explosion
pulse may be made based on procedures shown by Biggs (7), Rogers (8), and
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Burton (9)

In order to determine the maximum deflection of a member subjected to

dynarr:ic loading, the designer must know the magnitude and duration of the
pulse, the natural frequency of the structure and, of course, the span length,
modulus of elasticity and moment of inertia of the member being deflected.

A general expression commonly used indicates that the dynamic deflection
equals the product of a Dynamic Load Factor, D. L. F. , times the deflection,
X

. , caused by a static load equivalent in magnitude to the dynamic load.

statw

In

equation form:
X

= (D. L. F.)

(2)

(X tat· )

s

lC

The static deflection is determined using common formulas for deflection within
the elastic range of the material used.

The Dynamic Load Factor for a tri-

angular pulse, which the explosion pulse is ideally assumed to be, may be
determined by solving the differential equations of motion for the structure, or
may be taken from graphs similar to those shown in Appendix A.

C.

Radius of Destruction

Prentiss (10) and Wessman and Rose (11)

discuss formulas, used on the

European Continent, which give a value for the radius of destruction caused by
an impacting and exploding projectile.

While the equations are applicable, in

the strictest sense, to the effects of aerial bombs which conta.tn one hundred
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pounds, or more, of high explosive, some of the factors which must be considered
may be extended to this investigation.

For aerial bombs, these factors include

the weight of the explosive charge, the proportion of the charge below the ground
surface, a coefficient for the medium, and a tamping coefficient. Whereas this
investigation assumes projectiles which detonate upon impact, at or very near the
ground surface, an expression applicable to bombs must consider penetration
since the impact velocity of bombs may exceed 1000 feet per second, and some
penetration will take place in the few milliseconds between initiation and actual
detonation of the projectile.

The radius of destruction of a bomb may be calcu-

lated from the following expression (10, p. 42 and 11, p. 124):

R~2.5~

(3)

where
R

= Radius of destruction, in feet.

C =Weight of explosive, in pounds.

ex. = A coefficient for the medium in which detonation takes place;
for earth it is 0. 7.

f3

=Proportion of the charge below ground surface.

5 =A tamping coefficient, which varies from 1. 0, for complete
penetration, to 3. 5, for incomplete penetration.
The total depth of destruction is found by combining R, from Equation 3, the
depth of penetration, if any, and the distance from the center of gravity of the
explosive charge to the nose of the projectile.
then be determined as:

The minimum depth of cover may

13

D

=R

+ (h- a)

(4)

where
D = Required depth of cover, in feet.
R = Radius of destruction, in feet.
h =Depth of penetration, in feet.
a =Distance from center of gravity of the charge to the nose of the
projectile, in feet.
It is important to note that, according to Wessman and Rose (11, pp. 124-125),
" ••• in the development of this formula, the assumption was made that only that
part [of the bomb] which is below the ground surface is effective in producing a
crater."

The Field Manual on Explosives and Demolitions (12) presents the following
equation, known as the Breaching Formula:
(5)

where
P

= Pounds

of TNT required.

R =Breaching radius, in feet.
K = Material factor.
C = Tamping factor.
Rearranging in the form of Equation 3:

R

~vKCp

(6)
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For good timber and earth construction, the value of K may be taken as 0. 23.
Values for C vary from 2. 3, for surface detonation, to 1. 25, for complete
penetration into the overhead cover.

D.

Relative Effectiveness of Explosives

It should be noted that the Breaching Formula was derived for the explosive
TNT.

No mention was made as to the type of explosive used in Equation 3 for

calculation of the radius of destruction.

However, the time period (1935-1942)

would lead one to believe that TNT, or some less powerful explosive, was the
assumed explosive in the derivation of this expression.

The differences in the

effectiveness of TNT and the newer explosives, such as Composition B, may
be easily considered, using the Relative Effectiveness of explosives.

Notes

taken in lectures and handouts distributed by Ash (13, 14) during a course in
Explosives Engineering, Mining 307, taken as a part of the writer's graduate
course work show that the Relative Effectiveness of one explosive to another
may be determined by considering the ratio of the explosives' density and
square of their detonating velocity.

In other words:

(7)

where

=

The Relative Effectiveness of Explosive 2 to that of Explosive 1.
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p

1

& p

2

==The density of the respective explosives.

D & D == The detonating velocity of the respective explosives.
2
1
These handouts included the approximate density and range of detonating velocity
for most of the high explosives used by the military, as shown in Table I.

Table I.

Density and Detonating Velocity

of Common Military Explosives.

Explosive

Density, in grams
per cubic
centimeter

TNT

1.0

20000-23000

Composition B

1.6

25000-26000

Composition C-4

1.5

26000-27000

PETN

1.2-1.6

22000-24000

Detonating Velocity,
in feet per second

By using the expression for Relative Effectiveness, one may consider a specific
explosive when using either Equation 3 or Equation 6 to determine the radius of
destruction.

Calculation of Relative Effectiveness is necessary if the explosive

contained in the projectile, against which protection is desired, is not TNT, or
values may be taken directly from Explosives and Demolitions (12, pp. 83-84).
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E.

Cratering Effects of 81mm Mortar Rounds and 155mm Artillery Rounds

Cratering effects of 81mm mortar rounds and 155mm artillery rounds, exploded
at the ground surface, have been investigated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, as reported by Carre (15).
The referenced rounds were statically detonated and their orientation varied from
vertical, to forty-five degrees, to horizontal.
coarse sand.

The soil at the test area was a

In a cohesionless soil it would be difficult to determine the true

crater dimensions; however, the apparent crater dimensions for these rounds are
shown in Table II.

Table II. Apparent Crater Measurements for Surface
Detonated 81mm Mortar and 155mm Artillery Rounds.

Type

Orientation

81mm

Vertical

Apparent Depth,
in feet

Average Apparent
Diameter, in feet

0.9

2.7

81mm

45°

0.8

3.8

81mm

Horizontal

0.6

3.4

Vertical

1.1

4. 8

155mm
155mm

45°

1.1

7.4

155mm

Horizontal

1.4

6.7
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Since the trajectory of an incoming ronnd usually causes the angle of impact to be
greater than forty degrees, the data obtained for the horizontal orientation might
be neglected.

The average apparent depth and diameter of the crater caused by the

81mm are then 0.85 feet and 3.25 feet, respectively.

The average apparent depth

and diameter of the crater caused by the 155mm round becomes 1.1 feet and 6.1
feet, respectively.

It is interesting to compare these measured apparent crater

data with the theoretical values for radius of destruction, as calculated using
Equation 3 and Equation 6. One should certainly expect these values to be less
than the calculated values, since these are apparent dimensions. Calculations and
comparisons are shown on pages 25-29.

F.

Construction Materials

Discussions with the writer's military associates, such as Primmer (16) and
Hill (17 ), confirm that others have used timber as the primary material for
protective structures construction. The basic assumption that construction
priorities cause timber to be the most readily available material for this type of
construction appears valid.

In addition, due to the urgency of the situation and

priorities established for equipment utilization, the additional fabrication time and
equipment required for reinforced concrete or structural steel construction often
cause the use of these materials to be less practical than timber.

Wood is an extremely good material for this type of construction due, primarily,

to its ability to absorb increased loads which act for short periods of time. A
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discussion of the mechanical properties of wood and allowable stresses for various
loading conditions is presented by Scofield and O'Brien (18) and Wangaard (19). Of
primary importance to the design of protective structures are the allowable stress
reductions for unseasoned timber, defects in the wood, or continuous loading due
to the earth.

According to Scofield and O'Brien (18, p. 11):

In most wood structures the long time loading induces a stress
less than 90% of that permitted for Normal Loading and, therefore, need not be checked separately. Under exceptional conditions such as structures subject to continuous maximum earth
or water pressure, the design should be investigated for long
time maximum loading using working stresses 90% of those used
for Normal Loading.
If lmots or other defects are present in members, allowable stress reductions

should definitely be made. In the case of continuous earth loading the ten percent
reduction in allowable stress is highly recommended by the writer, even if the
earth cover does not stress the member to its allowable limit.

G.

Experimental Models

To avoid the expense of full-size protective structures and the requirements
for artillery pieces, or at least mortars, the use of a model for the initial portion
of the investigation was considered.

Murphy (20), discusses the use of pre-

diction equations and their application to true and/or distorted models.

Particular

note is made of the fact that certain difficulties may be encountered if one expects
the dead load stresses and distortions to have the same relative effects in both the
model and the prototype.

Pertinent to this investigation, Murphy (20, pp. 80,
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163) states:
If the length scale is to be greater than 1, the material in the
model must be proportionately heavier or less stiff or both .

. . . the duration of the applied impulse in the model must be
reduced in comparison with that in the prototype if similarity
is to exist. That is, the impulse must be "sharper" in the
model.
The first requirement can be met without great difficulty, by proper selection of
building materials for the model and proper compensation for weight.

The second

requirement causes considerable difficulty in that controlling or properly
reducing the duration of the impulse on the model is almost impossible. The
duration of the impulse on the prototype for the particular type of loading being
investigated is extremely short and to obtain even "sharper" impulses would
require the use of extremely short lengths of explosive charge, or the use of an
explosive with a considerably higher detonating velocity, or both.

Thus, the

design of small-scale structures, as either true or distorted models, was not
attempted.

The Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi, was visited as
a part of this investigation.

Ballard (21) reported that small-scale structures

are used in some of the testing conducted at that facility.

However, these are

used only to observe effects and are not normally used to attempt to accurately
predict the action of a prototype. During this visit several segments of high
speed photographic films were observed, which showed the effects of explosions
on sections of small-scale roof slabs constructed of reinforced concrete.

The
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observed failure mechanism appeared to be a prmching shear failure rather than a
flexural failure.

This failure mechanism did not occur when adequate depths of

soil were used over the slab.

For soil depths less than this amormt, the

explosion pulse caused a failure that, at least initially, could best be described
as "someone prmching his fist through the

slab~"

Naturally, once the reinforcing

bars were cut, the remainder of the slab failed and fell.

The true failure

mechanism, due to such a short term loading, would have been difficult to
observe without the use of high speed photography.

High speed photography supports the comments of Wessman and Rose (11),
made in early 1942, that bending of a beam caused by a short duration explosion
load would be very localized. They compared the distinct localized action caused
by a bullet penetrating glass and the localized deflection of the net of a tennis
raclet when striking a tennis ball to the effects caused by a projectile upon a
beam or slab. Wessman and Rose (11, pp. 101-102) stated:
Original span length has no significance in calculating initial
bending moments due to an equivalent static load based on
initia.!J. deflection. Presumably, the beam would eventually
vibrate as a whole and assume a deflection curve associated
with the fundamental mode, ... but it is the initial effects
which are of major concern to the engineer. Values of ~
rthe length of beam subjected to localized bendingl
are very small in comparison with actual span lengths.
Just what significance may be attached to this beyond emphasizing the initial localized action is a matter for debate.
0

0.
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H.

Field Observations

In an effort to obtain actual field data as to the effects of exploding projectiles

on protective structures, the questionnaire and cover letter shown in Appendix B
were mailed to selected Engineer Battalion Commanders in the Republic of
Vietnam.

Units were selected in an effort to obtain information from all areas of

the country from the Demilitarized Zone to the Mekong Delta. Although response
to the inquiries was good, only one contained sufficient information upon which
comments could be made or a comparison could be made with theoretical values.

Captain P. B. Hassman (22 ), Assistant Operations Officer of the 20th Engineer
Battalion, 18th Engineer Brigade, reported on the effects of a direct hit by a
122mm rocket.

His information is shown pictorially

in Figure 2.

The cratering

effects of this projectile, in rock of 3 -in. diameter or less, compare with those
observed by the writer during his tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam. The
"funnel tip" phenomenon is peculiar to rockets.

This, also, was observed by the

writer, although the observed impact areas were limited to compacted areas, such
as unsurfaced roads and airstrips. In these cases the "funnel tip" was not as deep
as that shown in Figure 2. The average depth was about 12 to 15 inches depending
on the degree of compaction.

In addition, the angle of the "funnel tip" to the

vertical was larger indicating a greater firing range. Application of the basic
laws of motion provide an apparent and logical, though not positively established,
explanation of this phenomenon.

In the case of an exploding mortar or artillery

Res~lting ~rate~fr:

~recti H1t• 122mm__

Burster Layer
Uncompacted

~:ocket

__ _

~~

18 11

---1--18"

Soil----~

Burster Layer

12 II

Uncompacted S o i l - - - - - . . . . / / / / / / /
Waterproof Membrane~
~

12"

Steel Matting
Waterproof Membrane____......

,
A<

7

<

5

R

2"

>tEl.

~
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Figure 2.

Cross Section of Overhead Cover on Protective Structure
Which Sustained a Direct Hit of a 122mm Rocket.
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round, the mass approaches zero almost instantaneously upon detonation.

The

rocket, on the other hand, does not lose the majority of its mass upon detonation
of the high explosive in the warhead.

The trailing portion, which contained the

now expended propellent charge, is not fragmented and continues to travel until
stopped by the material upon which the rocket lands.

The effects of the

explosive warhead of rockets are similar to those of an artillery projectile with
an equivalent amount of explosive; however, the propellant tube must be stopped
prior to penetrating the actual structure. Obviously a more impervious barrier,
than that formed by small rocks and uncompacted earth, must be provided.

Rocks

of 6 to 8-in. diameter or tightly bound logs placed near the top of the cover have
been suggested (1, chap. 3, pp. 11-12).
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III. DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL PROCEDURES

A rigorous design of protective structures involves several complex parameters.
First, a design round must be selected and the physical properties of the explosive
and the geometry of the explosive charge contained therein must be known.

Second,

soil pressures at the base of the overhead cover, as evaluated by the Boussinesq
equation, or similar procedure, are questionable and afford only an approximation
of the depth of soil required to reduce the overpressure to a level which would
cause deflections within the elastic range of the structural member.

Finally, the

determination of the deflection caused by the dynamic load becomes very involved,
as the solution of the differential equations of motion is not a simple task.

The

assumption of a triangular pulse probably closely approximates the actual pulse
of an explosion. However, for surface detonation of rounds which impact at some
angle other than vertical, the percentage of the pulse which may be reflected,
rather than transmitted into the cover, and the percentage of explosive energy used
to rupture the shell casing affect the selection of the maximum amplitude of the
pulse. In addition, this type of structure would certainly be subjected to considerable damping, caused by the earth cover, and this would affect the solution of
the equations of motion, and the selection of a Dynamic Load Factor.

The number and complexity of the variables involved would make procedures
for rigorous design of protective structures too unwieldy for most military
engineers to use quickly and effectively.
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The destructive effects of surface detonated explosive projectiles, as applied
to protective structures, may be nullified rather simply by using an adequate depth
of overhead cover on the structure. Assuming energy dissipation into the atmosphere 'md utilizing the energy absorbing characteristics of wood and loose earth,
determination of the design load for the structure may be greatly simplified by
considering only two variables; the minimum depth of cover required and the unit
weight of the soil.

This minimum depth of cover, in final form, will include the

radius of destruction of the explosive charge, an additional amount to absorb metal
fragments and perhaps a factor of safety, as specified by the local commander.
In any case, it should exceed the measured depth or radius of the true crater

caused by the design round in the local soil, and must be sufficiently deep to
prevent a possible punching shear failure mechanism.

Theoretical values for the radius of destruction may be obtained from
Equations 3 and 6, and, in general, would be expected to be larger than those
observed in apparent craters.

In using Equation 3, if surface detonation is assumed the proportion of

charge below the ground surface, /3 , would be zero.

This would give a value for

radius of destruction equal to zero. A value for {3 of one-tenth should be conservative, especially if the round is fused to detonate upon impact. A value for
0 may then be determined by interpolation between L 0 and 3. 50.
is

For earth, a

o. 7. The radius of destruction of an 8lmm mortar round, with a charge
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weight of 2.1 pounds of Composition B explosive is calculated, using Equation 3,
as follows:

6 = 3. 50 - f3 (3. 50-1. 00)
= 3.50- 0.1(2.50)
=3.50-0.25

= 3.25

=

1.13 feet

The total depth of destruction may then be determined based on the assumed depth
of penetration, i.e., one-tenth of the charge length, and the distance from the
center of gravity of the explosive charge to the nose of the round, as shown in
Equation 4.

Consideration of these factors will usually give values for the total

depth of destruction which exceed the calculated value for R.

As previously stated, the Breaching Formula was derived for TNT. In order
to use the revised formula, Equation 6, the Relative Effectiveness of the explosive
used to that of TNT must be considered.

For Composition B, the Relative

Effectiveness is 1.35 (13, pp. 83-84). Assuming surface detonation, C = 2.3 for
an untamped explosive and for good timber/earth construction K may be taken as
0.23 (13, p. 97).

The radius of destruction for the 81mm mortar round is
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calculated, using Equation 6, as follows:

R='"'3~

VIZC

=

= 1. 75

feet

A 155mm artillery round contains approximately 15.34 pounds of Composition
B explosive.

Using the above assumed conditions, the radius of destruction is

determined by Equations 3 and 6 to be 2.19 and 3.39 feet, respectively.

There is a relatively large difference between the values for radius of
destruction calculated by Equation 3 and those obtained from Equation 6.

One

reason is that in Equation 3 no specific consideration is given to the Relative
Effectiveness of Composition B. It seems reasonable to assume that this equation was based on the effects of the explosive TNT, due to the period
in which it is reported to have been widely used.

(1935-1942)

If the Relative Effectiveness of

Composition B explosive is included in Equation 3, the calculated value for R for the
81 mm mortar round is increased from 1.13 feet to 1. 2 5 feet and the R for the
155mm round is inc rea sed from 2. 19 to 2. 43 feet.

The calculated values for R and

the average observed apparent crater depth and radius, for the vertical and fortyfive degree orientation from Table II, are shown in Table III.
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Table III.

Calculated Radius of Destruction

and Observed Apparent Crater Radius.

81mm

155mm

R, using Equation 3, with no
consideration of the Relative
Effectiveness of Composition B.

1.13 feet

2.19 feet

R, using Equation 3, considering
Composition B as 1. 35 times as
effective as TNT.

1. 25 feet

2. 43 feet

Observed Apparent Crater Depth
and Radius from Table II.

Depth = 0. 85 feet
Radius = 1. 62 5 feet

Depth = 1. 13 feet
Radius = 3. 05 feet

R, using Equation 6, considering
the Relative Effectiveness of
Composition B.

1. 75 feet

3. 39 feet
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No definite conclusions can be drawn from the above table, since the observed
craters were in a cohesionless soil and the data is for apparent craters rather than
radius of destruction, as calculated using Equations 3 and 6.

It is interesting to

note, however, that the two equations seem to bracket the observed apparent
crater radius.

Equation 3 gives a theoretical value of R, which is about 30 to 40

percent less than the observed apparent crater radius.

Equation 6 gives a

theoretical value which is about 8 to 11 percent greater than the observed apparent
crater radius.

This tends to reinforce the idea of making an on-the-spot crater

analysis in the field, and selecting the larger value of measured radius and
calculated R.

The values for R, calculated using the two equations, differ by approximately
40 percent. The density and detonating velocity of the TNT, or perhaps even less
effective explosive, used in the development of the equation for radius of destruction
(Equation 3) may partially account for the differences in material factors and
tamping factors used in the two equations.

Selection of the tamping factor would,

of course, depend on the soil characteristics where development tests were
conducted.

Selection of the material factor could have been based on tht: manner

in which this factor is used in the two basic equations. In the case of Equation 3,
it might be expected that attention was focused on the effects of a single bomb at
a time, whereas, in the development of Equation 5, consideration may have been
given to the fact that normally several charges, placed in a row, would be used
to destroy a timber and earth wall.

The combined effects of several charges,
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detonated simultaneously, could account for the smaller value of 0. 23 used as the
material factor in the Breaching Formula. Still another reason for the differences
in magnitude of these factors is the geometry of the explosive charge.

In the case

of bombs or artillery projectiles, one usually visualizes a long, cylindrical
charge, whereas in the application of Equation 5, one thinks of making the
required size charge by stacking blocks of TNT, or other explosive, against the
object to be destroyed.

The relatively small cross sectional area of the pro-

jectile and longer period of explosion pulse, as compared to the greater cross
sectional area and probably shorter period of explosion pulse in the breaching
charge, may account for the differences in the material and tamping factors used
in the two equations.

Finally, the assumption that only that portion of the bomb's

explosive charge below the ground surface contributes to the cratering effect is
questionable. A tamping coefficient and coefficient for the medium in which
detonation takes place, based on this assumption, would differ considerably from
those selected in another manner. As a basis for checking experimental results,
both Equation 3 and 6 were solved for various values of P.
graphically in Figures 3 and 4.
Composition B:

and for TNT:

R

= 2.5

The results are shown

Figure 3 is a plot of Equation 3, where for
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Figure 4 is a plot of Equation 6, where for Composition B:

R=

.35 X P
0.23 x2.3

and for TNT:

R=

Composition B is the explosive commonly contained in many mortar and conventional artillery rounds.
full-scale mock-ups.

TNT was used in this investigation for field testing on
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IV.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

The experimental procedures of the investigation were divided into two parts.
The first part consisted of the design and testing of a small-scale protective
structure.

In the second part the procedures and results of the first were

extended to a full-scale structure.

A. Small-Scale Protective Structures

The first step of this portion was to select a charge and determine its radius
of destruction.
blasting cap.

The selected charge was a Hercules, Number 6, non-electric,
This type charge was chosen because its cylindrical shape

approximates that of an artillery or mortar round.

Its relatively small size, the

equivalent of approximately 7 grains of PETN, allowed it to be fired near buildings
without endangering people or property. As a safety precaution, however, a
firing box (Fig. 5) was constructed.

All live firings were conducted in this box

and observations were made through the plexiglass side.

The inside dimensions

of 9 in. by 9 in. were chosen to accomodate either a square baking pan filled with
gelatin or a small-scale protective structure.

The first series of live firings involved observation of the cratering effect
of an exploding blasting cap on gelatin covered with increasing depths of earth
cover.

The first shot was made with the blasting cap in direct contact with the
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Figure 5. Plywood and Plexiglass Firing Box.

gelatin.

As expected, severe cratering and permanent distortion of the gelatin

was noted (Figs. 6, 7).

For the second shot, a 1/4-in. deep layer of sand was

placed on top of a new pan of gelatin and the firing repeated.

The resultant true

crater in the gelatin measured 2-1/2 in. in diameter and 1-1/2 in. deep.
third shot was made with a 1/2-in. deep layer of sand on the gelatin.

A

The

resulting true crater size was determined to be 1-1/2 in. in diameter and
slightly less than 1 in. deep.

For shot four, 3/4 in. of sand cover was used.

The true crater was observed to be 1-1/4 in. in diameter and 1/2 in. deep
(Figs. 8, 9 ).

Shots five and six were made with corresponding increases in

depths of sand cover.

The resulting true crater which followed shot six was

3/8 in. in diameter and 1/8 in. deep for a sand cover of 1-1/4 in.

From this it

was predicted that for 1-1/2 in. of sand cover, there should be no visible
damage to the gelatin.

This prediction proved accurate, as shown in Figures

10 and 11. Additional tests were not conducted to determine the absolute
minimum depth of sand, between 1-1/4 in. and 1-1/2 in., required to prevent
damage to the gelatin, since it is reasonable to assume that an absolute
minimum depth of cover will not be used on the prototype. The relationship
observed between the depth of true crater in gelatin and depth of sand cover is
shown in Figure 12.

There are 7000 grains per pound, so the weight of the explosive charge in
the blasting cap may be taken as 0. 001 pounds. PETN is 1. 66 times as
effective as TNT.

Using these values with Equation 3:
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Figure 7. Crater in Unprotected Gelatin.
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Figure 8. Partially Protected Gelatin.

Figure 9. Crater in Partially Protected Gelatin .
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F~gure

10. Crater in Protective Cover.

Figure 11. Undamaged Gelatin.
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R=2.5~
0.1 xl.66x 0.001
0. 7 X 3. 25

= 2. 5

=0.105feet
= 1. 2 6 inches
This value is 16 percent less than the measured radius of destruction for sand and
gelatin, but seems to compare favorably when considering all the assumptions made
in order to use the equation.

Using Equation 6 and the Relative Effectiveness of PETN, the radius of
destruction is determined as:

R= ,3JL""

VKC:

=

. 66 X 0. 001
0.23x2.3

= 0.146
= 1. 75

feet

inches

This value is almost 17 percent higher than the measured radius of destruction,
but could serve well as a "built-in" factor of safety.

As observed previously, in Table III, the experimentally determined radius
of destruction is bracketed by the theoretical values obtained using Equations 3
and 6.
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Based on the sand and gelatin tests and the calculated values of R, smallscale protective structures were constructed and tests conducted to determine
whether 1-1/2 in. of sand cover would prevent a punching shear failure when the
blasting cap was detonated on top of the structure.

The selected structure was

assumed to represent a small guard bunker, 9 ft by 9 ft

in size.

To limit the

area of failure to the roof, which seems to be the most critical area, the posts
and caps were made of l-in. by l-in. balsa wood and the diagonal braces were
1/2-in. by 1/2-in. balsa wood.

This substructure had sufficient strength to

limit failures to roof sections and was used for all small-scale tests (Fig. 13).

The first series of tests assumed a simple, solid-deck roof of planks laid
from cap to cap and covered with sand. With 1-1/2 in. of sand cover, the
blasting cap caused no visible damage to the decking (Fig. 14). A failure was
observed when the sand cover was reduced to 3/4 in. (Figs. 15, 16). Since the
purpose of this test was to establish that failure would not occur with 1-1/2 in.
of sand cover, further tests were not performed to determine the limiting
protective depth, between 3/4 in. and 1-1/2 in.

The next series of tests assumed a stringer-roof superstructure, upon
which decking and sand cover would be placed (Fig. 17).

This small-scale bunker

is shown before and after the test firing with 1-1/2 in. of cover in Figures 18 and
19.

The results of the second shot are shown in Figure 20.

l-in. of sand cover was used on the structure.

For this shot, only

No damage was observed in this
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Figure 13 . Substructure Used for Small-8cale Testing.

Figure 14.

Undamaged Solid-Deck Roof.
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Figure 15. Damaged Solid-DeckRoof.

Figure 16. Damaged Solid-Deck Roof.

Figure 1 7. Small-Scale Bunker, Stringer-Roof Superstructure.
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Figur e 18. Bunker With Adequate Cover.

Figure 19 .

Undamaged Small-Scale Structure.
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case. Since the cap was directly over the center stringer, probably that stringer
was able to absorb the increased load.

In an actual situation, the round cannot

be assumed to impact directly over a stringer, therefore, a third shot was made
with the blasting cap offset from the stringer.

The cover used in this test was

1-1/4 in. and, as anticipated, failure occurred (Fig. 21).

For the final series of tests on small-scale bunkers another stringer-roof
superstructure was assumed.

The planks and stringers used in this case were

much smaller than those previously used and a failure was expected if the cover
on this structure was less than 1-1/2 in. In fact, there was some doubt that a
failure would be prevented by the 1-1/2 in. of cover, due to the small size of the
stringers and the decking.

However, as shown in Figures 22 and 23, no damage

was done to the structure as long as the cover was 1-1/2 in.

This structure was

subjected to a total of three shots without an observed failure.

B.

Full-Scale Structures

From the results of the first portion of the experimental investigation it was
tentatively concluded that failures may be prevented, and adequate protection for
personnel assured, by providing a minimum depth of cover equal to or greater
than the radius of destruction of the explosive charge.

To substantiate the theory

that only the uniformly distributed dead load caused by the minimum depth of
overhead cover need be considered when determining the size and spacing of
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Figure 20. Undamaged Bunker--Blasting Cap Detonated Over
a. Structural Member.

Figure 21. Damage to Small-Scale Bunker--Inadequate
Protective Cover.
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Figure 22. Undamaged Small-Scale Structure, With
Adequate Cover.

Figure 23.

Undamaged Small-Scale Structure--Adequate Cover.
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structural members, further tests were conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

These tests were similar to those using the blasting cap, gelatin and smallscale structures. A series of 4-pound charges of TNI' were detonated on the surface of the soil at the test site.

The true craters had an average depth of 11 in.

and an average radius of 21 in.

The average unit weight of the soil was determined

to be 104.3 pcf.

The radius of destruction for a 4-pound charge of TNT was cal-

culated using both equations for R.

Using Equation 3, R was calculated to be 17

in., and using Equation 6, R was calculated to be 23.5 in. Again, the theoretical
values of R tend to bracket the observed R.

A typical protective structure was assumed.
guard bunkers is 8 ft. by 8 ft.

One common size often used for

Two different roof sections were constructed.

The

first was designed to support the depth of earth indicated by Equation 3, and will
hereafter be referred to as "Bunker 1." The second roof section was designed
to support the depth of earth indicated by Equation 6, and will hereafter be referred
to as "Bunker 2 . "

For the first shot on each bunker, the depth of earth used was determined by
increasing the calculated values of R by 15 percent.

This was based on the

assumption that some additional earth would be used to absorb metal fragments
from an actual exploding projectile.

The two roof sections were designed to

support 20 in. and 27 in. of earth, respectively.
of the stringers was 7 ft,

The unsupported span length

and the unit weight of the soil was 104.3 pcf.
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Materials available for construction were assumed to be limited to nominal 2 x 12
planks.

Spacing of the roof stringers was determined by considering the properties

of the soil and the properties of the materials to be used in construction.
actual dimensions of the members were 1-1/2 in. by 11-1/2 in.

The

Using the section

modulus of the member and the allowable flexural and horizontal shear stresses
for the grade and species of lumber, it was determined that four stringers would
be needed for Bunker 1 and five stringers would be required for Bunker 2.

One of the problems which originally led to this investigation was encountered
in the design of these roof sections. When the construction materials were
purchased, the grade and species of lumber was described as Number 2, Southern
Pine having an allowable flexural stress, f, of 1200 psi and an allowable horizontal shear stress, H, of 105 psi.

However, when the materials arrived at the

construction site, it was observed that the planks selected for stringers were
Number 1, Dense, KD, Southern Pine, with an allowable f of 1700 psi and an
allowable H of 120 psi.

Both bunkers were quickly redesigned, based on the dead

load of soil, and it was determined that the number of stringers in each section
could be reduced by one.

Three stringers, spaced 45 in. center-to-center, were

used for Bunker 1 and four stringers, spaced 32 in. center-to-center, were used
for Bunker 2 (Figs. 24, 25).

A 4-pound charge of TNT was detonated on each roof without failure of any of
the structural members (Figs. 26, 27, 28 and 29).

A failure was not anticipated

in the roof section covered with 27 in. of earth, since small-scale tests had
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Figure 24. Full-8cale Bunker 1.

Figure 25. Full-8cale Bunker 2.
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Figure 26. Bunker 1--Before Firing.

Figure 2 7. Bunker 1--After Firing.
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Figure 28.

Bunker 2--Before Firing.

Figure 29. Bunker 2--After Firing.
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indicated that no failure would occur when the actual depth of cover exceeded the
measured R, in this case 21 in.

A failure was expected in the roof section

covered with only 20 in. of earth due to the fact that even with a 15 percent increase
in R, calculated using Equation 3, the depth of cover was less than the measured
R of 21 in.

It was originally intended to conduct additional tests using a minimum depth

of earth cover on the structures.

The intended cover for the respective roof

sections was to be 17 in. and 23.5 in., the R calculated using Equations 3 and 6.
Since Bunker 1, the roof section with three stringers, covered with only 20 in.
of earth was not damaged, it seemed reasonable to assume that Bunker 2, the roof
section with four stringers, covered with 23.5 in.

of earth would not be damaged.

Therefore, further testing was limited to Brmker 1.

A test on Bunker 1 with 17 in. of cover was conducted. Weather conditions
on the day of this test, while typical of what must be anticipated in an actual
situation, caused considerable difficulty.

The soil cover was almost saturated

and this increased the dead load on the structure by as much as 25-35 percent.
A failure was anticipated, since the depth of cover was 4 in. less than the
observed true crater radius and the dead load on the structure was greater due to
the increased moisture content of the soil.

In general, the actual failure was

confined to the area directly under the explosive charge.

The two pieces of

decking directly under the charge were severely damaged with both flexural and
shear failures being noted.

None of the stringers were damaged; however, the
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structure displaced sideways and the stringers rotated until their 11-1/2 in.
dimension was in a horizontal orientation. This very localized failure could have
been prevented by providing a greater depth of earth for cover over the structure.
In the case of this particular roof section, an addition of only 3 in. of earth

should have provided sufficient depth to prevent failure.
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V.

CONCLUSIONS

Although sufficient data was not obtained to provide statistical analysis,
the basic concept appears valid.

Since testing, using actual impacting and

exploding projectiles, must be performed to completely confirm the concept,
further tests with static detonations of TNT were not conducted.

Based on

the data. and results obtained within the limits of the investigation the following
conclusions are drawn:

1.

The basic concept of providing a minimum depth of earth cover for a

given explosive charge is valid.

2.

The very short duration of a surface detonated explosion pulse and

the energy absorbing characteristics of loose soil work to the designer's
advantage.

Protective structures, subject to attack by the type and size

projectiles assumed in this investigation may be designed by considering
the dead load of the soil and the mechanical and physical properties of the
timbers used for the structure.

Appropriate adjustments in allowable stresses

and factors of safety applied to the dead load provide an even greater degree
of protection.

3.

Loose dry soil, contained by sandbag retainer walls,has better energy

absorbing characteristics and reduces construction time, as compared to
overhead cover composed entirely of partially filled sandbags.

The added
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confinement of the soil, due to the individual sandbags, may appreciably
increase the load transmitted to the structural members.

In addition, nearly

saturated earth has very poor energy absorbing characteristics.

4.

Graphs showing required depth of cover versus explosive charge and

the measured unit weight of the soil to be used for the overhead cover provide
a quick and easily understood method of determining the design load for the
structure and greatly simplify design, or changes in design, of protective
structures.

5.

The revised Breaching Formula gives conservative values for the

radius of destruction, R.

Use of this equation could lead to over-designed

protective structures and excessive use of materials.

6.

The measured radius of destruction, as determined by the crater

analysis, provides a good check on the calculated value of R; as the general
terms for material factor, included in Equations 3 and 6, may not apply to
the particular soil used for the overhead cover.

The depth of cover used on

the protective structure should not be less than the measured radius of
destruction.

7.

Values of R obtained from the equation for radius of destruction of a

bomb may be inadequate if used without a factor of safety.

Although tests

conducted during this investigation were generally successful, the assumptions
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made in the use of this equation may not apply to different soils or an actual
exploding projectile.

The assumption, that only the portion of the charge

below the ground surface contributes to cratering, used in the derivation of
this expression is not valid.

Some cratering must be anticipated, even in the

case of surface detonated explosive charges.

However, this equation does

consider penetration of the projectile, weight of explosive charge, a tamping
coefficient, and a coefficient for the medium in which detonation takes place.
As such it could be used to begin an investigation which deals with fuse-delay
projectiles.
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VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

As in many cases, during the course of this research several questions
or problems arose which, although pertinent, were beyond the scope of this
investigation.

Although the data and results substantiate the concept for rapid

field design, the limitations of time and facilities precluded tests or study of
related problems.

The following are recommendations for further study and continued research in conjunction with the design of protective structures:

1. The basic concept should be field tested, using actual explosive projectiles.

The short duration of the surface detonated explosion pulse causes

practically negligible deflections in the structural members; however, the
kinetic energy of the impacting round may be sufficiently large to cause
flexural failures within the few milliseconds between impact and actual detonation of the explosive contained in the projectile.

2.

The explosive effects of rockets appear to be no more severe than any

other explosive projectile of comparable size.

The propellant tube of the

rocket is not fragmented upon detonation of the explosive warhead and continues
to travel until stopped by the earth cover on the protective structure.

A study

of the most efficient materials for use as a barrier against this propellant tube
and the location of this barrier, i.e. , near the top or bottom of the overhead
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cover, would be beneficial.

3.

Equations 3 and 6 both contain terms which consider a tamped, or

confined, explosion pulse.

The increased radius of destruction of a fuse-

delay projectile may be obtained by using different tamping coefficients in
these equations.

However, this is the relatively simple part of a design

problem dealing with fuse-delay projectiles.

The period of time between

initiation and actual detonation may range from several milliseconds to
several minutes.

The amount of penetration will depend on the impact velocity,

the composition of the overhead cover and the properties of the materials used
in the cover.

In order to prepare a graph of Minimum Depth of Cover versus

Explosive Charge applicable to fuse-delay projectiles, the radius of destruction
of a confined explosion pulse must be increased by the amount of penetration
prior to detonation.

This could provide areas for at least two additional in-

vestigations, i.e., penetration in cohesionless soils and penetration in cohesive soils.

4.

The impact kinetic energy of the projectile, prior to detonation of a

fuse-delay shell, is transmitted to the structural members, but just how much
this energy might be attenuated by the loose soil in the overhead cover provides
an additional area for further study.
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APPENDIX A

Dynamic Load Factor for Explosion Pulse
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In order to determine the deflection of a member subjected to a dynamic

load one must know the natural period, T , of the structure, the duration and
N

maximum amplitude of the dynamic load and the shape of the pulse.

Deter-

ruination of the natural period of the structure is not difficult, but for structures
similar to those being investigated a rough estimate of one to ten seconds for
the natural period would probably provide sufficiently acceptable results upon
which to choose or determine a Dynamic Load Factor. An explosion is ideally
assumed to cause a triangular pulse and the duration of this pulse may be determined using the expression given by Baum (3) as:
t =2.t
-

(1)

D

where
t =the duration of the pulse, in seconds .

.t

= the

length of the explosive charge, in feet.

D = the detonating velocity of the explosive, in feet per second.
The Dynamic Load Factor may be determined analytically by solving the differential equation of motion for a structure subjected to a triangular pulse, or
it may be taken from a graph similar to that presented by Biggs (7).

For a

triangular pulse, this graph gives the Dynamic Load Factor for various ratios
of time of pulse to natural period, t/T N" After selecting a Dynamic Load
Factor, the deflection due to a static load equal in magnitude to the maximum
amplitude of the dynamic load may be determined using the usual equations
for deflection.

The product of the deflection, so determined, and the Dynamic

Load Factor is the deflection caused by the dynamic load.
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In the particular case of explosion loading, difficulty is encountered in
choosing a Dynamic Load Factor.

For example, if the explosive charge is

one foot long and has a detonating velocity of 20, 000 fps, Equation 1 gives a
time of pulse, t, of:
t == 2.f

=

D

2

X

1, 0 ft

20, 000 fps

10

-4

seconds

The assumption of 20, 000 fps for the detonating velocity is conservative.
Most of the high explosives used in the military have a detonating velocity
of from 23,000 to 26,000 fps.

Assuming an approximate natural period for

the structure of one second, the ratio of time of pulse to natural period,
t/T N , is 10

-4

.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' graph, as presented by Biggs and
shown in Fig. 30, shows a Dynamic Load Factor of about 0. 16 for a value
of t/T

N

equal to 0. 05.

It seems reasonable to assume a much smaller value

of Dynamic Load Factor for values of t/T N in the range of 10

-4

to 10

-5

. If

the graph is extrapolated for smaller ratios of time of pulse to natural period,
the Dynamic Load Factor approaches very small values for ratios between
4
3
10- and 10- (Fig. 31).

Selection of a reliable Dynamic Load Factor, based

on this extrapolation, is difficult.

An expression which gives an approximation

of the Dynamic Load Factor for values of t/TN in this very small range is:

(7)
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For a t/T N of 10

-4

the Dynamic Load Factor is 0. 000314.

As an example, consider a timber beam, 10ft long, subjected toadynamic load caused by the explosive charge discussed above.

Considering the

density and detonating velocity, the maximum explosion pressure is approx6

imately 1. 5 x 10 psi.

Assuming an area of influence on the structure of
6

30 sq. in., the maximum amplitude of the explosion pulse is 45 x 10 lb.
6
Assuming a value of E for timber of 1. 5 x 10 psi, a moment of inertia of
4
3
the beam of 10 in. and considering the load as being concentrated at mid-

span, the static deflection is computed as follows:
3
PL
=X saw
t t•
48EI

=

=
Multiplying X

(8)
6

45

X

10 lb.
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X

1.5

X

X

1728

6
10 psi

X

3
3
10 in.
4
3
10 in.

X

108 inches.

. by the Dynamic Load Factor of 0. 000314, the deflection
static

due to the dynamic load is determined to be 0. 034 in. , which is certainly
within the elastic range of the member.

By proper spacing of members, the designer can insure that the dynamic
deflection and deflection caused by the earth cover does not exceed the maximum
allowable deflection for each structural member.
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Box 52, Route 1
Rolla, Mo. 65401

Commanding Officer,

Dear Sir:
The purpose of this letter is to ask your assistance in gathering field data
for possible use in preparing my thesis toward a Master of Science Degree in
Civil Engineering. I am presently enrolled at the University of Missouri Rolla, under the Army's Graduate School Program. Having returned from
Vietnam last November, I am fully aware that your time is extremely valuable.
Although my letter is lengthy, the information I am requesting is fairly concise.
During my tour with the 8th Engineer Battalion, 1st Air Cavalry Division,
I served as Commanding Officer of Company A, and later as Assistant S-3 of
the Battalion. We had access to Standard Designs, complete with bill of materials, for structures which could be used as Tactical Operations Centers or anything else the tactical commander desired. These, we assumed, had been
designed with all factors considered, including suspected or probable enemy
incoming mortar and/or artillery rounds.
Only once, during my tour, was the responsible supply officer able to fill
the required BOM as presented in the Standard Designs. Rather, the materials
received were normally of reduced dimensions and in smaller quantities than
originally requisitioned. The economics of having a standard design and sticking to it are not in question; however, my experience was that even though the
required materials were not on hand the tactical commander needed his TOC as
soon as possible. This, then, forced the engineer, in conjunction with the
tactical commander, to redesign the final structure based on his experience and
the available materials. When the job was completed, that ego deflating question, "Will it take a direct hit from a
round?", caused some embarrassment to many of us. To the best of my knowledge, none of our structures failed
during enemy mortar, rocket or artillery attacks, but I'm still concerned that
we engineers were not able to positively answer the question on the spot.
This is the subject I propose to investigate for my thesis. As you are
aware, FM 5-34 does not contain a complete discussion of the variables involved
in this type of structural dynamics problem. My plans are to try to identify these
governing variables, e. g., weight of incoming round, weight and type of explosive
contained therein, thickness and composition of overhead cover, span length of
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structural members, etc., and provide some type of analytical guidelines for
future use by combat engineer leaders. Hopefully this can be reduced even to
terms and expressions which can be interpreted and used by all engineer leaders, not just the structural engineers.
As previously stated, my letter is long; however, I have presented to you
the background concerning my topic of investigation. Your cooperation in completing the short questionnaire will be greatly appreciated. This data will aid
in verifying or rejecting predictions based on textbook analysis.
Perhaps, unknowingly, I have asked for some classified data. I hope this
is not the case, but if some of the questions do deal with classified information,
thus preventing you from completely answering the question, I will understand.
My student status at UMR can be verified by contacting the Professor of Military Science, University of Missouri - Rolla, Rolla, Missouri. Thank you for
any assistant you may be able to provide.
Sincerely,

JOHN R. CHILDRESS
Major, Corps of Engineers
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The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain field data. concerning structures
(primarily timber structures) built by combat engineer units in support of tactical operations. The information will be used, in conjunction with research, to
attempt to formulate guidelines and analytical techniques for use in the rapid
field design of protective structures, built in the Theater of Operations.
1. Number of protective structures, built by your unit, which sustained a direct hit from an enemy round. Please give a brief description of the extent of
damage, if any.

2. Size of the round and approximate range from which fired, e. g. 82mm mortar, 1500 meters.

3. Brief sketch, showing thickness and composition of overhead cover, size
and span length of structural member, approximate location of impact, etc.

4.

Other information which, in your opinion, will aid in this research.

A self-addressed, stamped, envelope is included for your use in returning
this questionnaire. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated and could materially affect the outcome of this research.

73

VIII.

1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Fortifications, Department
of the Army Field Manual 5-15, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1967, Chap. 3, pp. 11, 12.

2.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Engineer Field Data, Department
of the Army Field Manual 5-34, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1965, pp. 101-108.

3.

Baum, F. A., Stanyukovich, K. P., and Shekhter, B. I., Physics of an
Explosion, (Translation of Russian Book, Fizmatgiz, Moscow, 1959),
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Fort
Belvoir, Va., T-1488(a-q), pp. 181, 265, 323, 350, 383, 400, 496,
500-505, 657-663, 842, 893, ca. 1962.

4.

Zeldovich, Ia. B. and Kompaneyets, A. S., Theory of Detonation, Academic
Press, New York, 1955, pp. 257-261.

5.

Sowers, G. B. and Sowers, G. F., Introductory Soil Mechanics and Foundations, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, pp. 161-167.

6.

Bowles, J. E., Foundation Analysis and Design, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1968, pp. 68-73.

7.

Biggs, J. M., Introduction to Structural Dynamics, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., New York, 1964, pp. 43, 46, 51-58.

8.

Rogers, G. L., Dynamics of Framed Structures, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
New York, 1959, pp. 42-48, 58.

74

9.

Burton, R.A., Vibration and Impact, Dover Publications, Inc., New York,
1968, pp. 111-116, 122-128.

10.

Prentiss, A.M., Civil Air Defense, Whittlesey House, London, 1941,
pp. 42, 43.

11.

Wessman, H. E. and Rose, W. A., Aerial Bombardment Protection, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1942, pp. 101-102, 124, 125.

12.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Explosives and Demolitions,
Department of the Army Field Manual 5-25, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1967, pp. 83-84, 97.

13.

Ash, R. L., "The Mechanics of Rock Breakage: Part III Characteristics
of Explosives," Pit and Quarry, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1963, pp. 126-131.

14.

Ash, R. L., "The Compounding of Chemical Explosives," Lecture Notes:
Mining 307--Explosives Engineering, University of Missouri Rolla, 1969, pp. 12-13.

15.

Carre, G. L., "Design, Construction, and Evaluation of Protective Military
Structures," Technical Report N-68-1, U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss.,
August 1968, pp. 194, 217.

16.

Primmer, R. L., Major, Corps of Engineers, "Field Experiences while
Operations Officer of the 35th Engineer Battalion from November,
1967 to October, 1968," Personal communication, February, 1970.

17.

Hill, R. F., Captain, Corps of Engineers, "Field Experiences while Company Commander and Assistant Operations Officer of the 577th
Engineer Battalion from January, 1967 to January, 1968,"

75

Personal communication, February, 1970.
18.

Scofield, W. F. and O'Brien, W. H., Modern Timber Engineering, 5th
ed., Southern Pine Association, New Orleans, 1963, pp. 10-11,
15, 88-98, 108-116.

19. Wangaard, F. F., The Mechanical Properties of Wood, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York, 1950, pp. 10-25, 27-71, 77-204, 210-221.
20.

Murphy, G., Similitude in Engineering, The Ronald Press Company,
New York, 1950, pp. 32-51, 73-91, 112-129.

21.

Ballard, J. T., Engineer, Protective Structures Branch, Nuclear Weapons Effects Division, Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg,
Miss., "Evaluation of Damage to Small-Scale Structures Caused
by Explosive Charges," Personal communication, August, 1969.

22.

Hassman, P. B., Captain, Corps of Engineers, "Field Experiences while
Assistant Operations Officer of the 20th Engineer Battalion, 18th
Engineer Brigade, " Personal communication, July, 1969.

76

IX.

VITA

John Ross Childress was born on December 18, 1939, at Cairo, Illinois.
He received his primary and secondary education in the Public School System in Sikeston, Missouri.

In January, 1962, he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Physics
from the Missouri School of Mines and Metallurgy at Rolla, Missouri, and
was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, United States Army.

He was

selected to attend the University of Missouri - Rolla under the Army's Graduate Degree Program and began graduate study in February, 1969.

Major Childress is married to the former Miss Margaret Jean McClintic
of Springdale, West Virginia.

